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INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, corporate law in India has undergone
significant reforms with implications for not only corporate governance
but also for questions about the purpose of the corporation and
beneficiaries of the corporate form. Following years of debate and
attempts at reforms that began in the late 1990s, India’s reform efforts
culminated in the 2013 Companies Act (hereinafter the “Act” or the
“Companies Act”).1 The Act has been described as “the single most
important development in India’s history of corporate legislation” and a
“watershed” event for corporate law reforms in the country.2 Much
attention has been placed on specific aspects of the new Companies Act,
such as the requirements that firms provide specific corporate social
responsibility (CSR) disclosures or appoint independent directors.3
In designing India’s new corporate law, policymakers grappled with
the subject of corporate purpose and with determining which institutional
structure could best further the purpose of the corporation. When viewed
holistically, the Companies Act is a radical experiment with corporate
purpose. The Companies Act does not specifically define corporate
purpose, other than stating that a company may be formed for any “lawful
1. See The Companies Act, No. 18 of 2013, INDIA CODE (2013) (India) [hereinafter Companies
Act, 2013].
2. Bala N. Balasubramanian, Strengthening Corporate Governance in India: A Review of
Legislative and Regulatory Initiatives in 2013-2014, 2 (IIM Bangalore Research Paper No. 447, Jan.
2014).
3. See generally Afra Afsharipour & Shruti Rana, The Emergence of New Corporate Social
Responsibility Regimes in China and India, 14 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 175 (2014) (discussing CSR
requirements); Vikramaditya S. Khanna & Umakanth Varottil, Board Independence in India: From
Form to Function?, in INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS IN ASIA: A HISTORICAL, CONTEXTUAL AND
COMPARATIVE APPROACH (Harald Baum et al. eds., 2016) (discussing independent director
requirements under the Companies Act).
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purpose.”4 Nevertheless, the Act’s various provisions regarding a board’s
fiduciary duties and responsibilities make clear that shareholder wealth
maximization should no longer be the primary lens for decision-making
by Indian boards. One of the most essential provisions of the Act declares
that corporate directors “shall act in good faith in order to promote the
objects of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole, and in
the best interests of the company, its employees, the shareholders, the
community and for the protection of environment.”5 Moreover, the Act’s
code for independent directors requires them to “safeguard the interests of
all stakeholders” and to “balance the conflicting interest of the
stakeholders.”6 These duty-focused provisions are bolstered by several
other important provisions relating to CSR spending and disclosure and,
in some cases, stakeholder access to board members.7 The substantive
reforms of the Companies Act are then overlaid with an extensive
disclosure regime that envisions a vast increase in corporate transparency.
The Indian experiment with corporate purpose is worthy of analysis
for several reasons. First, as the world’s largest democracy, legislative
changes in India could have a significant impact on the lives of more than
1.2 billion people living in the country.8 Second, as Indian companies
become even larger global players, the corporate governance of Indian
firms will have wide implications for many people outside of India. Third,
India is an attractive country for global investors,9 and if the Indian
experiment with more socially responsible firms succeeds, investors could
be persuaded to push for similar reforms around the world. Fourth, the
Indian experiment has been noticed and debated by stakeholders and
commentators globally who hope to emulate India’s move toward
corporations with legally mandated responsibilities to stakeholders
beyond shareholders.10
4. Companies Act, 2013, supra note 1, § 3.
5. Companies Act, 2013, supra note 1, § 166.
6. Companies Act, 2013, supra note 1, sch. IV, paras. II (5), (6).
7. See infra notes 97–125 and accompanying text.
8. See INDIA GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS INDEX: 2016-2017 EDITION, WORLD ECONOMIC
FORUM, http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-index/country-profiles/#economy=IND
[https://perma.cc/7DRK-6NF9].
9. See Sneha Shah & Baiju Kalesh, India is Among the Most Attractive Investment Destinations:
Sri Rajan, Bain India, ECON. TIMES (July 20, 2015, 5:37 PM), http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/
opinion/interviews/india-is-among-the-most-attractive-investment-destinations-sri-rajan-bainindia/articleshow/48146026.cms [https://perma.cc/HV2W-QH62].
10. See, e.g., Sandeep Gopalan & Akshaya Kamalnath, Mandatory Corporate Social
Responsibility as a Vehicle for Reducing Inequality: An Indian Solution for Piketty and the
Millennials, 10 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y. 34 (2015) (advocating for a model similar to India’s to be
adopted in the U.S.); Jingchen Zhao, Promoting a More Efficient Corporate Governance Model in
Emerging Markets Through Corporate Law, 15 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 447 (2016)
(discussing India’s CSR model as a potential example for other emerging economies).
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India’s new corporate law, in many ways, engages with debates in
other parts of the world to redefine the purpose of the corporation. Given
the large extent to which corporate law in India looks at comparative
examples from other common law jurisdictions, this Article primarily
focuses on comparative developments in the U.K. and U.S.11 In the U.K.,
for example, the concept of “enlightened shareholder value” was
introduced through the passage of the U.K. Companies Act 2006.12
Similarly, the U.S. has also been debating the purpose of the corporation
and experimenting with different forms of business entities aimed at
moving away from the claim that the law requires shareholder wealth
maximization as the primary purpose of the corporation.13 In the U.S., the
emergence of new types of business entities, such as the benefit
corporation, clearly challenges long-held views that the purpose of the
corporation is to maximize shareholder wealth.14
There are many similarities between India’s 2013 Companies Act,
the U.K.’s codification of directors’ duties, and the re-examination of
corporate purpose within the movement toward benefit corporations in the
U.S. Similar to the U.K. approach, India has codified directors’ duties in
the 2013 Companies Act. Like the U.S. benefit corporations approach,
India’s legislative changes extend beyond codification of directors’ duties.
11. For a discussion of U.S. and U.K. influences on Indian corporate law, see generally Afra
Afsharipour, Corporate Governance Convergence: Lessons from the Indian Experience, 29 NW. J.
INT’L L. & BUS. 335 (2009) [hereinafter Afsharipour, Corporate Governance Convergence];
Umakanth Varottil, The Evolution of Corporate Law in Post-Colonial India: From Transplant to
Autochthony, 31 AM. U. INT’L. L. REV. 253 (2016) [hereinafter Varottil, Evolution of Corporate Law].
12. For a detailed comparison of the U.K.’s ESV framework and Section 166(2) of the India’s
Companies Act, 2013, see Mihir Naniwadekar & Umakanth Varottil, The Stakeholder Approach
Towards Directors’ Duties Under Indian Company Law: A Comparative Analysis, (NUS - Centre for
Law & Business, Working Paper No. 16/03, Aug. 11, 2016).
13. See generally J. Haskell Murray & Edward I. Hwang, Purpose with Profit: Governance,
Enforcement, Capital-Raising and Capital-Locking in Low-Profit Limited Liability Companies, 66 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2011). For an overview of the many different types of new business entities
that have arisen since the mid-2000s, see J. Haskell Murray, State Laboratories and Social Enterprise
Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PARTNERSHIPS, LLC AND ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS (Robert W. Hillman & Mark J. Loewenstein eds., 2015). For debates about this
claim, compare Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear Eyed Understanding
of the Power and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware General Corporation Law,
50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761 (2015), and J. Travis Laster & John Mark Zeberkiewicz, The Rights
and Duties of Blockholder Directors, 70 BUS. LAW. 33 (2014), with LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER
VALUE MYTH (2012), and Lyman Johnson, Law and Legal Theory in the History of Corporate
Responsibility: Corporate Personhood, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1135 (2012).
14. See Lyman Johnson, Law and the History of Corporate Responsibilities: Corporate
Governance, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 974, 990 (2013) [hereinafter Johnson, Law and the History of
Corporate Responsibilities] (describing benefit corporations as an “avowed rejection of a strict and
exclusive focus on investor welfare [that] expressly permit corporate directors to craft corporate
strategy in a way that both benefits investors and advances a larger general or specific social and
environmental purpose”).
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India’s move toward a broader purpose for the corporation, much like the
move toward benefit corporations in the U.S., flies in the face of longstanding beliefs that corporations “are incapable of having social or moral
obligations.”15 Like the benefit corporation model in the U.S., profit
maximization is no longer clearly the primary lens in decision-making by
Indian boards. Instead, Indian boards must now consider a variety of
interests in running the company. The legislative changes enhancing the
responsibilities of directors to all stakeholders are bolstered by specific
disclosure requirements and a “soft mandate” for CSR spending by the
board.16 Both the U.K. and U.S. comparisons are useful in that many of
the questions over the value of the enlightened shareholder value (ESV)
model and benefit corporations, and whether each will achieve the goals
of protecting stakeholder interests, are similar to questions that can be
raised with respect to India’s corporate law reforms.
There are also important differences between the reforms undertaken
in India and those undertaken in the U.S. and U.K. Under the U.K.’s ESV
model, shareholder interests arguably remain the top priority of boards.
India, however, has recognized both shareholder and stakeholder interests
“without necessarily indicating a preference to either.”17 India’s approach
also differs from recent movements in the U.S. Much of the changes
toward more socially responsible corporations in the U.S. have arisen from
changes in business norms and practices rather than through legislative
changes.18 This is in stark contrast to India’s recent corporate law reforms,
which clearly mandate, both through company law legislation and through
securities regulation, stakeholder rights, social responsibility, and board
diversity, among other matters. Unlike the benefit corporation model in
the U.S. that mandates broader board responsibilities for a select class of
companies that have opted into the benefit corporation status, the move
toward social responsibility and stakeholder duties in India applies to all
publicly traded corporations and even to some large unlisted companies.
While the Indian experiment has been hailed, like the benefit
corporation experiment and ESV model, it is not clear that the lofty goals
of the Companies Act will truly come to fruition. Certainly, there is a need
for additional time to assess the Indian model’s aim and effectiveness. The
Companies Act in India arguably does not push forward a new corporate
purpose as far as it could. For example, the CSR provisions of the Act
seem to equate CSR with corporate philanthropy rather than promote
15. Daniel R. Fishel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1273
(1982).
16. See Afsharipour & Rana, supra note 3, at 218.
17. Varottil, Evolution of Corporate Law, supra note 11, at 315.
18. See Johnson, Law and the History of Corporate Responsibilities, supra note 14, at 975.
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strategic CSR with a holistic view of the impacts businesses have on
society and the environment. Moreover, while directors must consider the
interests of all stakeholders, many of the remedies provided under the
Companies Act are given only to shareholders and not to all stakeholders.
This comparative analysis of India’s move toward redefining
corporate purpose proceeds as follows. Part I presents an overview of
global debates over corporate purpose, drawing principally from the move
toward the ESV model in the U.K. and benefit corporations in the U.S.
This section briefly recounts the debates in both jurisdictions about
whether the changes they have experienced will engender more socially
responsible corporations. Part II then provides a condensed history of
corporate law reforms in India and an overview of the legislative changes
undertaken in the past decade. In Part II, this Article takes a broad
approach toward analyzing the Act and argues that the various provisions
of the Act demonstrate a move toward broader corporate purpose. In Part
III, this Article argues that despite the goals of Indian law makers in
passing the Companies Act, there are serious shortcomings in the law as it
pushes toward a pluralistic stakeholder oriented purpose. Part III identifies
several structural challenges that stand in the way of a move toward
companies that truly are responsible to a wide variety of constituencies,
including vagueness in the legislation, promoter-dominated ownership
structures, ineffective institutional framework to support enforcement
efforts by stakeholders generally, and weaknesses in the judiciary. These
challenges suggest that India’s experiment with corporate purpose is one
that is uncertain to succeed.
I. GLOBAL DEBATES AND EXPERIMENTS WITH CORPORATE
FORM AND PURPOSE
A. The Shareholder–Stakeholder Debate
The corporate purpose debate is a long-standing and fundamental
question for corporate law around the world. The concept of corporate
purpose is centrally tied to the function and duties of the corporate board.
Whose interests must the board consider when making decisions? What
does it mean to say that corporate directors owe a fiduciary duty to the
corporation? Does the board’s fiduciary duty to the corporation mean that
directors must focus on maximizing the wealth of shareholders even at the
expense of other nonshareholder constituencies? To what extent can
directors consider the interests of a broader group of stakeholders than just
shareholders?
Questions about corporate purpose and the role and responsibilities
of directors in advancing the purpose of the corporation have arisen in
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many different contexts and jurisdictions. In the U.S., for example,
vigorous debates as to whether the board of directors should have duties
only to shareholders or whether their duties should extend to stakeholders
beyond shareholders go back to the early 1930s.19 Many noted scholars
have argued that “shareholder value is the proper object of corporate law”
because “focusing principally on the maximization of shareholder returns
is, in general, the best means by which corporate law can serve the broader
goal of advancing overall social welfare.”20 Other scholars argue that, in
managing the company, the board must consider the interests of all
stakeholders, such as employees, consumers, and the general public and
must make decisions for the benefit of all stakeholders.21 Under the
stakeholder view “the corporation has both public and private roles.”22
Debates over the stakeholder versus shareholder-oriented models
have occurred in other parts of the globe as well, with countries settling on
different approaches. Many countries have more readily recognized the
stakeholder approach than the shareholder oriented approach adopted in
U.S. corporate law, particularly Delaware law.23 Moreover, international
organizations have articulated the stakeholder approach in their various
principles.24 The Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) principles of corporate governance, for example,
state that boards should “take into account the interests of stakeholders”
and should “take due regard of, and deal fairly with, other stakeholder

19. See Lyman Johnson, Unsettledness in Delaware Corporate Law: Business Judgment Rule,
Corporate Purpose, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 405, 435–37 (2013) [hereinafter Johnson, Unsettledness]. The
famous debate was between Adolf Berle and Merrick Dodd who struggled with questions over the
nature and purpose of the corporation. See A.A. Berle Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44
HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1060–69 (1931); E. Merrick Dodd Jr., For Whom are Corporate Managers
Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1153–57 (1932). Berle emphasized the fiduciary duties of
managers toward shareholder-beneficiaries, while Dodd argued for broader obligations to a wider set
of constituencies, including employees, consumers, and the public at large. In the 1970s, Milton
Friedman argued for a strong shareholder wealth maximization goal. See Milton Friedman, The Social
Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970 (Magazine), at 32.
20. REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 28–29 (2d ed. 2009); see also Henry Hansmaan & Reinier Kraakman, The
End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 441 (2001) (arguing that the best way to achieve
aggregate social welfare is by focusing on shareholder wealth maximization).
21. See Johnson, Unsettledness, supra note 19, at 435–36.
22. Virginia Harper Ho, “Enlightened Shareholder Value”: Corporate Governance Beyond the
Shareholder–Stakeholder Divide, 36 J. CORP. L. 59, 71 (2010).
23. See id. at 72; Sanford M. Jacoby, Corporate Governance in Comparative Perspective:
Prospects for Convergence, 22 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 5, 6 (2000); JAYATI SARKAR & SUBRATA
SARKAR, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN INDIA 17–18 (2012). Outside of Delaware, many states have
adopted constituency statutes that permit directors to consider the interests of a broad range of
stakeholders when making decisions. See generally Brett H. McDonnell, Corporate Constituency
Statutes and Employee Governance, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1227 (2004).
24. See SARKAR & SARKAR, supra note 23, at 17.
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interests including those of employees, creditors, customers, suppliers and
local communities.”25
Even with respect to Delaware law, there are strong opinions
supporting one position or the other, with fundamental ramifications for
the purpose of the corporation.26 As Professor Lyman Johnson has noted,
not only have scholars and jurists debated “what the purposes of the
corporation should be,” but there is a fundamental dispute among these
experts as to what “the law really is” on corporate purpose—in other
words, “whether the law requires the maximization of shareholder wealth
as the sole or predominant corporate purpose.”27 Recently, Chief Justice
Strine of the Delaware Supreme Court proclaimed that “a clear-eyed look
at the law of corporations in Delaware reveals that, within the limits of
their discretion, directors must make stockholder welfare their sole end,
and that other interests may be taken into consideration only as a means of
promoting stockholder welfare.”28 On the other hand, other experts argue
that shareholder wealth maximization is neither a legal requirement, even
in Delaware, nor a desirable approach to corporate purpose.29
B. Moving Away from Shareholder Wealth Maximization:
U.K. and U.S. Examples
In several countries, questions about corporate purpose have resulted
in actual legislative changes. For the purposes of this Article, two of the
most prominent changes are those undertaken in the U.K. and the U.S., the
two jurisdictions that Indian corporate law often looks to for inspiration.
In the U.K., legislators settled on the ESV model as adopted in
Section 172 of the U.K. Companies Act.30 Section 172 defines the duties
of directors as follows:

25. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 51, 53
(2015), http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/Corporate-Governance-Principles-ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/
TT79-B98M].
26. Compare Strine, supra note 13, at 763–68, with LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE
MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC
30–31 (2012).
27. Lyman Johnson, Relating Fiduciary Duties to Corporate Personhood and Corporate
Purpose, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON FIDUCIARY LAW 11 (D. Gordon Smith & Andrew Gold eds.,
forthcoming 2016); see also David G. Yosifon, The Law of Corporate Purpose, 10 BERKELEY BUS.
L.J. 181 (2013).
28. Strine, supra note 13, at 768.
29. See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 733, 736 (2005).
30. For a brief history of the purpose of Section 172, see Andrew R. Keay & Hao Zhang, An
Analysis of Enlightened Shareholder Value in Light of Ex Post Opportunism and Incomplete Law,
8 EUR. CO. & FIN. L. REV. 1, 6–9 (2011).
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[A] director . . . must act . . . in good faith . . . to promote the success
of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole, and in doing
so have regard to . . . the likely consequences of any decision in the
long term[;] the interest of the company’s employees[;] the need to
foster the company’s business relationships with suppliers, customers
and others[;] the impact of the company’s operations on the
community and the environment[;] the desirability of the company
maintaining a reputation for high standards of business conduct[;]
and the need to act fairly as between members of the company.31

Some scholars have argued that Section 172 makes clear that
directors must, as a fundamental matter, advance and “prioritize” the
interests of shareholders above all else.32 Thus, while corporate directors
must “have regard” for the interests of nonshareholder constituencies,
these interests “are relevant only insofar as they relate to the paramount
goal of advancing the shareholders’ interests.”33
Other commentators have argued that the ESV model “transcends the
shareholder–stakeholder divide.”34 These scholars argue that under the
ESV framework:
[A]ttention to traditional “stakeholder” interests such as the effect of
corporate operations on the environment, employees, or local
communities, is seen as a means of generating long-term shareholder
wealth and improving portfolio- and firm-level risk assessment.
Enlightened shareholder value thus emphasizes the benefits to
shareholders that can result from focusing corporate management on
areas of shared shareholder and stakeholder concern while
recognizing the very real challenges posed by the diversity of
shareholder and stakeholder interests. At the same time, by asserting
that shareholders should not achieve wealth through disregard for the
impact of corporate decision-making on stakeholders, enlightened
shareholder value also parts course to some degree from the standard
shareholder wealth maximization conception of the corporate
purpose.35

Thus, the ESV framework goes beyond paying just lip service to
stakeholder interests. Directors must, in good faith, consider the interests
of stakeholders even if shareholder interests trump stakeholder interests.
Accordingly, if the board makes decisions that seek to opportunistically
benefit shareholders at the expense of other stakeholders, “then they might
31. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46 § 172 (Eng.) (emphasis added).
32. See CHRISTOPHER M. BRUNER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE COMMON-LAW WORLD:
THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF SHAREHOLDER POWER 34 (2013).
33. Id. at 44.
34. Harper Ho, supra note 22, at 62.
35. Id.
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well be in breach because such action is not likely to benefit the company
in the long term or accord with either ideas of the directors engaging in
responsible behavior, as envisaged by the . . . principles underpinning the
concept of ESV.”36
In the U.S., the corporate purpose debate has undergone an important
shift with the emergence of benefit corporations and other hybrid business
entities.37 Of the various models that have proliferated, such as benefit
corporations, low-profit limited liability companies (L3C), benefit LLCs,
and social purpose corporations, the benefit corporation has gained the
most steam across the U.S.38 To date, benefit corporation statutes have
been adopted in more than thirty states, with proposed legislation being
debated in a number of other states.39
Benefit corporations have three fundamental characteristics
addressing corporate purpose, board accountability, and reporting. More
specifically, benefit corporations feature (1) a requirement that they must
have a corporate purpose to create a material positive impact on society
and the environment; (2) an expansion of the duties of directors to require
consideration of nonfinancial stakeholders as well as the financial interests
of shareholders; and (3) an obligation to report on their overall social and
environmental performance using a comprehensive, credible,
independent, and transparent third-party standard.40
With respect to corporate purpose, benefit corporations allow the
board “to advance both investor and noninvestor interests, in aid of
pursuing a larger public benefit.”41 A “general public benefit” is defined
in the Model Benefit Corporation Legislation as “[a] material positive
impact on society and the environment, taken as a whole, assessed against
a third-party standard, from the business and operations of a benefit
36. Keay & Zhang, supra note 30, at 10.
37. For a comprehensive overview of the many different types of hybrid entities formed since
the mid-2000s, see generally J. Haskell Murray, The Social Enterprise Law Market, 75 MD. L. REV.
541, 588 (2016) [hereinafter Murray, The Social Enterprise Law Market].
38. The rapid expansion of the number of states with benefit corporation statutes is in large part
due to the advocacy of B Lab and other proponents of the benefit corporation. See id. at 547.
39. About B Lab, BCORPORATION, https://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps/about-b-lab
[https://perma.cc/U68G-79YL]; State by State Status of Legislation, BENEFITCORP.,
http://benefitcorp.net/policymakers/state-by-state-status [https://perma.cc/GVX7-FHBF]. Delaware
passed a benefit corporation statute that became effective on August 1, 2013. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§§ 361–68 (2013).
40. WILLIAM H. CLARK JR. ET AL., BENEFIT CORP, THE NEED AND RATIONALE FOR THE BENEFIT
CORPORATION: WHY IT IS THE LEGAL FORM THAT BEST ADDRESSES THE NEEDS OF SOCIAL
ENTREPRENEURS, INVESTORS, AND, ULTIMATELY, THE PUBLIC 1 (Jan. 18, 2013),
http://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/Benefit_Corporation_White_Paper.pdf
[https://perma.cc/33N5-PFEF] [hereinafter CLARK ET AL., WHITE PAPER].
41. Lyman Johnson, Law and the History of Corporate Responsibilities: Corporate Governance,
10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 974, 975 (2013).
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corporation.”42 Thus, benefit corporations are designed to have “a
corporate purpose broader than maximizing shareholder value” and to be
responsible for maximizing “the benefits of [their] operations for all
stakeholders, not just shareholders.”43
There are several important legal distinctions that make the benefit
corporation form attractive to both investors and directors who seek to
achieve a corporate purpose that goes beyond shareholder wealth
maximization. Benefit corporation directors owe a fiduciary duty and are
legally obligated to make decisions that generate both a profit and a
positive social or environmental impact.44 Accordingly, a business that is
formed as a benefit corporation may be particularly attractive to certain
investors and consumers. There is also an argument that directors of
benefit corporations face a reduced risk of liability in the event of
shareholder suits alleging that the company’s management is prioritizing
other considerations over profits. Most benefit corporation statutes
provide that “the consideration of all stakeholders shall not constitute a
violation of the general standards for directors, which requires good faith,
the care of an ordinarily prudent person, and the consideration of the best
interests of the corporation.”45
Proponents of benefit corporations also argue that the model provides
greater transparency of the board’s decision-making process because the
company must issue an annual benefit report that is available to the public
and measures the public benefit against a third party standard that is
“comprehensive, credible, independent and transparent.”46 This third party
standard requirement has been described as an “essential” feature of the
benefit corporation.47 Some scholars have lauded the potential of the
benefit reporting requirement for developing and maintaining good
corporate governance practices.48
While there is much to be lauded in the benefit corporation
movement, scholars have launched several criticisms against the benefit
corporation. For example, several papers have argued that the
accountability and transparency measures provide little comfort that

42. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS., § 102 (2016). Scholars have noted that the wording in section
102 of the legislation may invite much need clarification from the judiciary. See Murray, The Social
Enterprise Law Market, supra note 37, at 567.
43. See MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS., § 101 cmt. (2016).
44. See CLARK ET AL., WHITE PAPER, supra note 40, at 16–17.
45. William H. Clark, Jr. & Elizabeth K. Babson, How Benefit Corporations Are Redefining the
Purpose of Business Corporations, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 817, 848 (2012).
46. Id. at 846.
47. Id. at 845.
48. See Alina S. Ball, Social Enterprise Governance, 18 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 919, 961, 970 (2016).
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benefit corporations will in fact achieve their lofty goals.49 Others have
argued that there may be potential unintended dangers with these new
business entities. Scholars have noted that a potential drawback of the
move toward benefit corporations is “the ‘ghettoization’ of corporate
responsibility within benefit corporations” and other hybrid entities. 50
These scholars argue that there is a risk of “even less attention to such
concerns in the traditional business corporation.”51 “The argument is that,
by resting on the false premise that managers of traditional corporations
must prioritize profits above all else, the benefit corporation form
undermines efforts to convince all corporate managers that CSR-driven
activities are consistent with their fiduciary duties.”52
Overall, the U.K. move toward the ESV model and the U.S. move
toward hybrid entities have generated both hopes about their success in
transforming the goals of corporate entities and skepticism about whether
the lofty goals surrounding these changes will be fulfilled. Many of the
debates with respect to both the ESV model in the U.K. and the move
toward hybrid entities in the U.S. echo the debates that have arisen with
respect to India’s experiment with corporate purpose.
II. TOWARD A NEW CORPORATE PURPOSE IN INDIA’S CORPORATE LAWS
Over the past decade, company and securities laws in India have
undergone a major transformation. Starting with industry efforts in the late
1990s, there has been a vigorous focus on reforming corporate governance
practices in India.53 After the introduction of voluntary governance
standards proposed by leading industry groups, both the Securities
Exchange Board of India (SEBI)—the country’s primary capital markets
regulatory authority—and the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA)
sprang into action to undertake more mandatory reforms. These efforts
culminated in comprehensive revision of India’s primary corporate
law—the Companies Act, 2013—as well as reform of the listing standards,
which were later adopted as the SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure
Requirements) Regulations, 2015.54
49. For an overview of the criticisms lodged against benefit corporations, see generally Murray,
The Social Enterprise Law Market, supra note 37, at 548–51.
50. Johnson, supra note 41, at 975.
51. Id.
52. Joseph W. Yockey, Does Social Enterprise Law Matter?, 66 ALA. L. REV. 767, 800 (2015).
53. For an overview of India’s corporate governance reform efforts, see AFRA AFSHARIPOUR,
HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN INDIA: LEGAL STANDARDS AND BOARD PRACTICES
7–28 (2016) [hereinafter AFSHARIPOUR, HANDBOOK].
54. See Bala N. Balasubramanian, Strengthening Corporate Governance in India: A Review of
Legislative and Regulatory Initiatives in 2013 2 (Indian Inst. Of Mgmt Bangalore Research Paper No.
447, 2014) (passage of the Companies Act, 2013 “is probably the single most important development
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A. History: Ambiguity Between Shareholder and
Stakeholder View Points
The history of India’s approach to the corporate purpose debate has
been described as “ambiguous at best.”55 This ambiguity is due in part to
India’s post-independence political engagement with socialism juxtaposed
against the reality of corporate ownership of Indian firms.56 As in many
other countries, controlling shareholders dominate corporate India.57 The
Indian corporate landscape is characterized by groups of companies that
are owned either by business families (i.e., the controlling shareholders or
promoters)58 or by the state.59 This concentrated ownership structure has
not changed despite years of significant economic and legal changes
affecting businesses in India. For example, a recent study of ownership
patterns for fifty large Indian firms found that ownership patterns
“continue to be skewed toward controlling inside shareholders—a legacy
of family-owned business ventures and state nationalization” and that “the
trend seems to be moving away from outside share ownership.”60

in India’s history of corporate legislation, next only to the monumental Companies Act 1956 which it
replaces”); AFSHARIPOUR, HANDBOOK, supra note 53, at 22–28.
55. SARKAR & SARKAR, supra note 23, at 18. In earlier periods, such as the colonial period,
Indian corporate law “was unequivocal in its zeal to protect shareholders so as to enable companies to
attract capital.” Varottil, Evolution of Corporate Law, supra note 11, at 312.
56. See Naniwadekar & Varottil, supra note 12, at 4; Varottil, Evolution of Corporate Law, supra
note 11, at 312.
57. See Zohar Goshen & Assaf Hamdani, Corporate Control and Idiosyncratic Vision, 125 YALE
L.J. 560, 563 (2016); N. Balasubramanian & R.V. Anand, Ownership Trends in Corporate India
2001–2011: Evidence and Implications (Indian Inst. of Mgmt, Bangalore, Working Paper No. 419,
2013).
58. The concept of “promoter” has specific legal significance in the Indian context. Promoters
in India are typically controlling shareholders but can also be those instrumental in a public offering
or those named in the prospectus as promoters. Section 2(69) of the Companies Act, 2013 defines a
“promoter” as “a person who (a) who has been named as such in a prospectus or is identified by the
company in the annual return referred to in section 92; or (b) who has control over the affairs of the
company, directly or indirectly whether as a shareholder, director or otherwise; or (c) in accordance
with whose advice, directions or instructions the Board of Directors of the company is accustomed to
act.” Section 2(27) of the Companies Act, 2013 defines control as “the right to appoint majority of the
directors or to control the management or policy decisions exercisable by a person or persons acting
individually or in concert, directly or indirectly, including by virtue of their shareholding or
management rights or shareholders agreements or voting agreements or in any other manner.”
59. For a listing of various studies regarding promoter shareholding in Indian companies, see
Umakanth Varottil, A Cautionary Tale of the Transplant Effect on Indian Corporate Governance, 21
NAT’L L. SCH. INDIA REV. 1, 18–20 [hereinafter Varottil, A Cautionary Tale]. Apart from absolute
shareholding in Indian public companies, the control of promoters is emboldened through other
mechanisms such as crossholding, pyramiding, and tunneling. See M. Bertrand, P. Mehta & S.
Mullainathan, Ferreting Out Tunneling: An Application to Indian Business Groups, 117 Q.J. ECON.
126 (2002).
60. George S. Geis, Shareholder Power in India, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SHAREHOLDER
POWER, 592–610 (Jennifer G. Hill & Randall S. Thomas eds., 2015).
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Scholars have noted that “colonial law in India was unequivocal in
its zeal to protect shareholders so as to enable companies to attract capital”
and corporate law under the colonial period did not recognize
nonshareholder interests.61 Nevertheless, with India’s post-independence
move toward socialist policies, Indian corporate law began to recognize
the interests of nonshareholder stakeholders, including employees and
creditors.62
Corporate purpose in India moved toward a more
shareholder-oriented approach in the first decade after economic
liberalization. A somewhat ambiguous shareholder-oriented corporate
purpose is reflected in the first significant corporate governance initiatives
undertaken in India. For example, in 1998 the Confederation of Indian
Industry (CII)—one of India’s largest industry and business
associations63—released its Voluntary Code of Corporate Governance
(Desirable Corporate Governance: A Code) for listed companies. The CII
Code states that the objective of good corporate governance is to maximize
long-term shareholder value and to “limit the claimants to shareholders
and various types of creditors.”64 Nevertheless, the CII Code does not fully
ignore stakeholders and declares that “this objective follows from a
premise that, in well performing capital and financial markets, whatever
maximises shareholder value must necessarily maximise corporate
prosperity, and best satisfy the claims of creditors, employees,
shareholders, and the State.”65
The focus on shareholders, with only a nod to stakeholders,
continued in the early government-commissioned reports on corporate
governance. Formed by SEBI in 1999 to help develop corporate
governance standards for publicly listed companies, the Committee on
Corporate Governance (the Birla Committee) issued a report that
decidedly saw shareholder interests as the focus of corporate purpose.66
According to the Birla Committee, shareholders “are the raison de etre for
61. Varottil, Evolution of Corporate Law, supra note 11, at 312.
62. See id. at 313–14.
63. CII, a non-government, not-for-profit, industry-led and industry-managed organization
dominated by large public firms, has played an active role in the development of India’s corporate
governance norms. See About Us, CONFEDERATION OF INDIAN INDUSTRY, http://www.cii.in/
About_Us.aspx?enc=ns9fJzmNKJnsoQCyKqUmaQ== [https://perma.cc/8Q7L-7QMY].
64. CONFEDERATION OF INDIAN INDUSTRY, DESIRABLE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A CODE
(1998), http://www.nfcgindia.org/desirable_corporate_governance_cii.pdf [https://perma.cc/7WTAWV5Z].
65. Id. at 1.
66. SHRI KUMAR MANGALAM BIRLA ET AL., THE SEC. & EXCH. BD. OF INDIA, REPORT OF THE
KUMAR MANGALAM BIRLA COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 2.5 (1999),
http://www.sebi.gov.in/commreport/corpgov.html [https://perma.cc/7WWL-5LVC] [hereinafter
BIRLA REPORT].
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corporate governance.”67 The committee did, however, exclaim that, while
it viewed the goal of corporate governance to be the “enhancement of
shareholder value,” the company must “strike a balance at all times
between the need to enhance shareholders’ wealth whilst not in any way
being detrimental to the interests of the other stakeholders in the
company.”68
Other reports in the 2000s similarly presented somewhat conflicting
pronouncements regarding corporate purpose. With respect to the
government-commissioned reports, scholars have criticized the lack of
any significant effort to determine “who should qualify as a legitimate
stakeholder” or to discuss “the relative weights to be assigned to the
different stakeholders, or to specify, in the recommendations, mechanisms
for ‘equitable distribution’ among the variety of stakeholders.”69 For
example, SEBI’s 2003 Murthy Committee focused on shareholders as the
“true owners” of the corporation and stated that good corporate
governance regimes display “a high degree of priority placed on the
interests of shareholders.”70 Much like the Birla Committee, the Murthy
Committee briefly touched upon the interests of stakeholders by stating
that a corporation must be “fair and transparent to its stakeholders” and
that, in being accountable to shareholders, boards must operate the
company “for the benefit of society as a whole.”71 Neither the Birla nor
the Murthy Committees clearly defined who encompassed stakeholders.
Despite some recognition of stakeholder interests from SEBI
Committees, India’s initial corporate governance reforms, enacted via
Clause 49 of the Listing Agreement, were shareholder focused.72 The
focus on shareholders was not surprising given the vast shortcomings in

67. BIRLA REPORT, supra note 66, at § 1.5.
68. Id. § 4.2; see also id. § 13.1 (“In the view of the Committee, the over-riding aim of
management is to maximize shareholder value without being detrimental to the interests of other
stakeholders.”).
69. SARKAR & SARKAR, supra note 23, at 20.
70. N. R NARAYANA MURTHY ET AL., THE SEC. & EXCH. BD. OF INDIA, REPORT OF THE SEBI
COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE §1.1.14 (2003), http://www.sebi.gov.in/
commreport/corpgov.pdf [https://perma.cc/7QR9-7SPW] [hereinafter MURTHY REPORT].
71. Id. at § 1.1.
72. In 2000, SEBI introduced unprecedented corporate governance reforms via Clause 49 of the
Listing Agreement of Stock Exchanges. The Listing Agreement with stock exchanges defines the rules
and processes that companies must follow in order to remain listed companies on an Indian stock
exchange. THE SEC. & EXCH. BD. OF INDIA, AMENDMENTS TO CLAUSE 49 OF THE LISTING
AGREEMENT (Sept. 12, 2000) (reporting changes in response to Birla Report); THE SEC. & EXCH. BD.
OF INDIA, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN LISTED COMPANIES: CLAUSE 49 OF THE LISTING AGREEMENT
(Aug. 26, 2003). For an overview of Clause 49’s initial reforms, see generally Afsharipour, Corporate
Governance Convergence, supra note 11, at 378–84.
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investor rights and disclosure in Indian corporate law prior to enactment
of Clause 49.73
In addition to committees formed by SEBI, the MCA also formed
several committees to address potential amendments of the Companies
Act. Most significantly, in December 2004 the MCA convened the Irani
Committee to evaluate the Companies Act with a focus on combining
internationally accepted best practices in corporate governance with the
particular needs of the growing Indian economy.74 The Irani Committee
expressed that the best approach to corporate governance in India would
be to construct a single framework of governance provisions for all
companies, requiring them to comply with a uniform set of rules.75 The
report of the Irani Committee made a few passing references to the
interests of other stakeholders, but its focus was clearly on shareholders,
with an emphasis on proposals to augment shareholder rights, especially
the rights of minority shareholders.76 The Irani report has been described
as “business friendly” and is aimed at “attracting greater investment” into
Indian firms.77
India began to more clearly move toward a stakeholder-oriented
approach with debates over various versions of the Companies Bill that
arose after the Satyam corporate scandal came to light in 2009.78 A
massive accounting fraud totaling more than $1 billion that involved one
of India’s then-leading technology companies as well as the Indian
affiliate of leading accounting firm PricewaterhouseCoopers; the Satyam
scandal has been billed as India’s Enron.79 The Satyam scandal served as
a catalyst for the Indian government to rethink the corporate governance,
disclosure, accountability, and enforcement mechanisms in place.80 In a
detailed account of corporate law in post-colonial India, Professor
Umakanth Varottil notes that The Companies Bill, 2009 (2009 bill) was
“shareholder-oriented, in that directors owed duties to carry on the

73. See Varottil, A Cautionary Tale, supra note 59, at 8–9.
74. JAMSHED J. IRANI ET AL., EXPERT COMM. ON CO. LAW, REPORT OF THE EXPERT COMMITTEE
TO
ADVISE THE GOVERNMENT ON THE NEW COMPANY LAW
3
(2005),
http://www.primedirectors.com/pdf/JJ%20Irani%20Report-MCA.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L2UFY5QQ] [hereinafter IRANI REPORT].
75. Id. at 8–9.
76. See id. at 3, 23, 41–44.
77. Varottil, Evolution of Corporate Law, supra note 11, at 290.
78. For further details of the Satyam scandal, see AFSHARIPOUR, HANDBOOK, supra note 53, at
18–19.
79. See Vikramaditya Khanna, Corporate Governance in India: Past, Present and Future?, 1
JINDAL GLOB. L.R. 171, 188–89 (2009) (comparing Satyam with the U.S. Enron scandal).
80. See Omkar Goswami, Aftermath Of Satyam, BUSINESSWORLD (INDIA), Jan. 23, 2009;
Prashant K. Sahu, Sapna Dogra & Aditi Phadnis, Satyam Scam Prompts Clause 49 Review, BUS.
STANDARD, January 14, 2009; AFSHARIPOUR, HANDBOOK, supra note 53, at 20.
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business of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole.”81 The
2009 bill made little reference to stakeholders other than a requirement for
certain companies to have a Stakeholder Relationship Committee to
“resolve the grievances of stakeholders” without defining who would
qualify as a stakeholder.82 The Parliamentary Standing Committee on
Finance, which reviewed the 2009 bill in a detailed report, abandoned this
shareholder-oriented approach.83 The Standing Committee instead
“insisted on a broader stakeholder approach to corporate law,” perhaps to
address political pressures and criticism of the corporate sector that had
arisen after the Satyam scandal.84 The Standing Committee’s review also
included a discussion of the extent of CSR being undertaken by Indian
firms and the need for a comprehensive CSR policy.85
In addition to the viewpoints of the Standing Committee regarding
CSR, the Indian government made other efforts to strengthen and
encourage CSR activities by Indian businesses. For example, in late 2009,
the MCA proposed the Corporate Social Responsibility Voluntary
Guidelines, which promoted the stakeholder-oriented triple bottom line
approach articulated in international CSR standards.86 Moreover, in 2011,
the MCA issued the National Voluntary Guidelines on Social,
Environmental & Economic Responsibilities of Business (ESG
Guidelines) to establish concrete measures to be voluntarily adopted by
companies to address interests of various stakeholders such as employees,
customers, and the environment.87
Following the initial report of the Standing Committee, the resulting
Companies Bill (2011) included substantial changes related to corporate
governance matters, including a greater emphasis on stakeholders, as well
as on CSR. Over the next several years, the MCA fluctuated between
imposing mandatory CSR requirements into the Companies Bill and
adopting CSR recommendations with a “comply-or-explain” approach,
81. Varottil, Evolution of Corporate Law, supra note 11, at 289; see also Companies Bill, 2009,
No. 59 § 147(2), INDIA CODE 2009 (India).
82. Companies Bill, 2009, No. 59 § 58(13), INDIA CODE 2009 (India).
83. See Standing Comm. on Fin., 15th Lok Sabha, The Companies Bill, 2009, 21st Report (Aug.
2010) [hereinafter Standing Comm. on Fin., 21st Report].
84. Varottil, Evolution of Corporate Law, supra note 11, at 289–91.
85. Standing Comm. on Fin., 21st Report, supra note 83, at 33, para. 49.
86. See Afsharipour & Rana, supra note 3, at 211. For further exploration of the triple bottom
line concept, see generally JOHN ELKINGTON, CANNIBALS WITH FORKS: THE TRIPLE BOTTOM LINE
OF 21ST CENTURY BUSINESS (1998); ANDREW W. SAVITZ & KARL WEBER, THE TRIPLE BOTTOM
LINE: HOW TODAY’S BEST-RUN COMPANIES ARE ACHIEVING ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND
ENVIRONMENTAL SUCCESS-AND HOW YOU CAN TOO (2006).
87. GOV’T OF INDIA, MINISTRY OF CORP. AFFAIRS, NATIONAL VOLUNTARY GUIDELINES ON
SOCIAL, ENVIRONMENTAL & ECONOMIC RESPONSIBILITIES OF BUSINESS, http://www.mca.gov.in/
Ministry/latestnews/National_Voluntary_Guidelines_2011_12jul2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/2CNGQ5Q9] [hereinafter ESG GUIDELINES].
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eventually settling on a compromise approach.88 In part to address some
of the concerns raised regarding the Companies Bill (2011) and the
debates, which ensued following the Satyam scandal, in 2012 the MCA
created the Godrej Committee to formulate a comprehensive policy
framework with practical suggestions to guide corporate governance in
India.89
The move toward a redefined corporate purpose was further
strengthened by the pronouncement of the 2013 Godrej Committee.90 The
Godrej Report enumerated a set of recommendations and general
principles that aimed to strengthen Indian corporate governance by having
these recommendations eventually adopted into law.91 The Godrej Report
explicitly recognized that corporate purpose is not about shareholder
wealth maximization, at least in the short term, stating the following:
[I]t is now more explicitly accepted that the shareholders have
responsibilities towards other stakeholders, and in particular the host
communities within which the company operates. Failure to respect
these obligations is likely to provoke negative interventions from
government or negative market reactions in the long term. If the
interests of all the relevant stakeholders are balanced, good corporate
governance should maximize the shareholders’ wealth and maintain
the company’s surrounding relationships. Therefore managers need
to satisfy and balance the interests of a wider set of stakeholders, not
simply the shareholders. Fair and balanced stakeholders’ perspective
results in long-term shareholder maximization value. Good corporate
governance is the reconciliation of otherwise (possibly) diverging
interests.92

Unlike prior government reports, the Godrej Report was more
specific with respect to potential stakeholders, identifying “creditors,
employees, and business partners, such as suppliers and the local

88. See Standing Comm. on Fin., 15th Lok Sabha, The Companies Bill, 2011, 57th Report, at
14–15 (June 2012).
89. AFSHARIPOUR, HANDBOOK, supra note 53, at 21.
90. NAT’L FOUND. FOR CORP. GOVERNANCE, GODREJ COMMITTEE, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE
CONSTITUTED BY MCA TO FORMULATE A POLICY DOCUMENT ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, 1
(2012) http://www.nfcgindia.org/pdf/Guiding-Principles-of-CG.pdf [https://perma.cc/F7UX-ZG46]
[hereinafter GODREJ REPORT].
91. See PTI, Govt. Considering Godrej Panel Suggestions on Corporate Governance, ECON.
TIMES (Mar. 14, 2013, 6:40 PM), http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/policy/govtconsidering-godrej-panel-suggestions-on-corporate-governance/articleshow/18972047.cms
[https://perma.cc/MR87-4PEX]; Press Release, Securities and Exchange Board of India, Consultative
Paper on Review of Corporate Governance Norms in India (PR No. 4/13) (Jan. 4, 2013),
http://www.sebi.gov.in/cms/sebi_data/attachdocs/1357290354602.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WSD5LMCQ].
92. GODREJ REPORT, supra note 90, at 5.
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community” as stakeholders.93 The Godrej Report also argued for greater
diversity in board composition to have a board that better addresses the
perspective of a variety of stakeholders.94
B. Reexamining Corporate Purpose? The Companies Act, 2013
and SEBI’s Listing Regulations
The process of reforming India’s corporate and securities laws,
particularly after the Satyam fiasco, involved significant debate about
corporate power and the role of the corporation in Indian society.
Moreover, there was a vigorous debate about the need for an explicit
public/private partnership in pushing India toward greater economic
development and equality.
After years of committee reports and discarded bills, the Companies
Act, 2013 was finally passed in August 2013.95 In line with the progression
of earlier debates and reports—in particular reviews by the Standing
Committee and the 2013 Godrej Report—the Companies Act no longer
articulates shareholder wealth maximization principles. Instead, the Act
envisions a significant cultural change for Indian firms, with a purpose that
goes beyond shareholder wealth maximization. Arguably, firms in India
are now a kind of “hybrid entity” that must be run for the benefit of
shareholders while at the same time considering the best interests of the
company’s “employees, the shareholders, the community, and . . . the
protection of [the] environment.”96
Several provisions of the Act, when viewed together, eschew
shareholder wealth maximization in favor of a balance between the
interests of stakeholders and shareholders. These provisions include
specific statutory articulation of the board’s fiduciary duties, board
responsibilities for CSR, enhanced disclosure and reporting requirements
that extend beyond matters relevant to shareholder wealth, and, in some
cases, board engagement with stakeholders beyond shareholders.
After passage of the 2013 Act, in 2015 SEBI amended its Listing
Regulations.97 The SEBI Listing Regulations reinforce the stakeholder
viewpoint encompassed in the Act, particularly with respect to large
companies.

93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See AFSHARIPOUR, HANDBOOK, supra note 53, at 22, for details about passage of the Act.
96. See Companies Act, 2013, supra note 1, § 166.
97. SEC. & EXCH. BD. OF INDIA, SEBI (LISTING OBLIGATIONS AND DISCLOSURE
REQUIREMENTS) REGULATIONS, 2015 (Sept. 2, 2015), http://www.sebi.gov.in/cms/
sebi_data/pdffiles/32763_t.pdf [https://perma.cc/4FVP-3VUF] [hereinafter SEBI LISTING
REGULATIONS].
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1. Board Fiduciary Duties and Independent Director Responsibilities
Unlike the 1956 Companies Act, the 2013 Act articulates broader
board responsibilities, including a sweeping provision codifying the duties
of directors as well as a specific code of conduct for independent directors,
which supplements the provisions on director duties and responsibilities.
Section 166 of the Companies Act, 2013 provides that directors must
“act in good faith in order to promote the objects of the company for the
benefit of its members as a whole, and in the best interests of the company,
its employees, the shareholders, the community and for the protection of
environment.”98 In reviewing the legislative history of Section 166,
scholars have argued that the language of the section was intentionally
drafted “to cast a positive duty on directors, and was not merely an
enabling provision.”99 Section 166 appears to imply that the company has
a wide array of stakeholders, including employees, shareholders, the
community, and the environment.
Section 166’s broad vision of directors’ duties to stakeholders is
reinforced in the Act’s Code for Independent Directors. The Code provides
that independent directors must “safeguard the interests of all
stakeholders, . . . [and] balance the conflicting interest of the
stakeholders.”100 Independent directors are charged with assisting in
“protecting the legitimate interests of the company, its shareholders and
its employees.”101 One of the challenges with both provisions is that there
remains vagueness as to the definition of stakeholders. Moreover, there
has been little guidance on how directors should go about balancing the
conflicting interests of stakeholders and how such balancing must work
when there are conflicts between shareholder and other stakeholder
interests.102
2. The Companies Act’s CSR Provisions
One of the most significant provisions of the Companies Act, 2013
is Section 135, which imposes a requirement for companies to have a CSR
committee and adopt a “comply-or-explain” approach toward mandatory
CSR spending along with mandatory CSR reporting.103 The reach of the
CSR clause is expected to be vast, with some experts estimating that at
98. See Companies Act, 2013, supra note 1, § 166. There is still debate as to whether Section
166 clearly imposes two duties of good faith, one to act in good faith to promote the objects of the
company for the benefit of its members and a separate duty on directors to act in good faith in the best
interests of stakeholders. See Naniwadekar & Varottil, supra note 12, at 10.
99. See Naniwadekar & Varottil, supra note 12, at 9.
100. See Companies Act, supra note 1, sch. IV, II(5)–II(6).
101. See Companies Act, supra note 1, sch. IV, III(12).
102. See Khanna & Varottil, supra note 3, at 26–27.
103. See Afsharipour & Rana, supra note 3, at 218–22.
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least 6,000 Indian companies will be required to comply with the CSR
provisions of the Companies Act.104
More specifically, Section 135 of the Act establishes that companies
with (1) a net worth of Rupees 500 crore or more (approx. $81 million),
(2) turnover of Rupees 1,000 crore or more (approx. $162 million), or (3)
net profit of Rupees 5 crore or more (approx. $811,400) during any
financial year must have a board-level CSR committee, with three or more
directors (one of them an independent director), to create and implement
a CSR policy.105 Such companies must spend 2% of their average profit in
the previous three years on CSR activities or explain their failure to do
so.106 If a company does not have adequate profit or is not in a position to
spend the prescribed amount on CSR, the regulation requires the directors
to provide a disclosure and give suitable reasons in their annual report.107
The Companies Act also includes a detailed schedule of CSR activities
that companies “may” undertake.108 In addition, the final rules adopted by
the MCA to implement Section 135 of the Act both define the term “CSR”
and expand the scope of permissible CSR activities.109 The final rules
provide significant limitations regarding what counts as CSR, excluding
the following from CSR activities and expenditures: (1) expenditures
incurred in undertaking normal course of business; (2) CSR activities
undertaken outside of India; (3) projects, programs, or activities meant
exclusively for employees and their families; and (4) direct or indirect
contributions to any political party.110

104. See CONFEDERATION OF INDIAN INDUS., HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY IN INDIA 5 (2013), http://www.pwc.in/en_IN/in/assets/pdfs/publications/
2013/handbook-on-corporate-social-responsibility-in-india.pdf [https://perma.cc/M39E-364J]; see
also ERNST & YOUNG, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY ADVISORY 2 (Jan 8, 2013),
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-Corporate-social-responsibility-advisory/
$FILE/EY-Corporate-social-responsibility-advisory.pdf [https://perma.cc/6LR8-MJXF] (estimating
that the law would cover over 2,500 companies in India, including the top 100 companies across
sectors). Other reports indicate that given the low profitability threshold in the Act, the CSR
requirements may apply to about 8,000 companies in India. INSTITUTIONAL INV’R ADVISORY SERVS.,
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: REVIEW OF CURRENT POLICIES, PRACTICES AND DISCLOSURES
13 (Mar. 2014), http://iias.in/downloads/IiAS_CSR_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/38NZ-P9W6]
[hereinafter CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: REVIEW].
105. Companies Act, 2013, supra note 1, § 135. Section 135 was operationalized through the
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Policy Rules, which were introduced at the Companies Act
through an amendment dated February 27th, 2014. Notification G.S.R. 129(E), GOV’T OF INDIA,
MINISTRY OF CORP. AFFAIRS, Feb. 27, 2014.
106. Companies Act, 2013, supra note 1, § 135.
107. Id.
108. Companies Act, 2013, supra note 1, § 135, sch. VII.
109. See GOV’T OF INDIA, MINISTRY OF CORP. AFFAIRS, THE COMPANIES (CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY POLICY) RULES, 2014, r. 5(1) (Feb. 27, 2014).
110. See id. at r. 4.
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3. Board’s Stakeholder Relationship Committee
Under both the Companies Act and the SEBI Listing Regulations,
certain Indian firms must have a stakeholder relationship committee.
Under Section 178(5) of the Companies Act, a company that has more than
one thousand shareholders, bond-holders, deposit-holders, and other
security holders must have a stakeholder relationship committee as part of
the board.111 Under the Act, the stakeholder relationship committee is
charged with considering and resolving grievances from financial
stakeholders only; no mention is made of other stakeholders.112 Similarly,
SEBI also requires listed entities to have a stakeholder relationship
committee to “consider and resolve the grievances of the security holders
of the listed entity including complaints related to transfer of shares, nonreceipt of annual report and non-receipt of declared dividends.”113
With respect to both the Companies Act and the SEBI Listing
Regulations, the constituency of stakeholders identified in the legislation
causes some ambiguity as to who the stakeholders are. Despite the use of
the term “stakeholders,” the definition of stakeholders with respect to this
committee is quite limited and only includes financial stakeholders.114
Other sections of the Act and the SEBI Listing Regulations, however,
imply a very broad set of stakeholders.115 Large companies in India have
seized upon the narrow definition of stakeholders in the Act and have
charged their stakeholder relationship committees with only reviewing and
redressing shareholder and investor grievances.116
4. SEBI Listing Regulations: Reinforcing a Broader Corporate Purpose
In November 2014, SEBI announced that it intended to convert the
Listing Agreement into the SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure
Requirements) Regulations to provide a comprehensive framework
111. Companies Act, 2013, supra note 1, § 178(5).
112. See Companies Act, 2013, supra note 1, § 178(6) (providing that the stakeholder
relationship committee is charged with considering and resolving the grievances of security holders
of the company).
113. SEBI LISTING REGULATIONS, supra note 97, sch. II, part D(B).
114. See Companies Act, 2013, supra note 1, § 178(6).
115. See, e.g., Companies Act, 2013, supra note 1, § 166.
116. See, e.g., INFOSYS LTD., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REPORT 2015–2016,
https://www.infosys.com/investors/reports-filings/annual-report/annual/Documents/AR2016/corporate-governance-report.html [https://perma.cc/U492-S5EH] (“We have a Board-level
stakeholders relationship committee to examine and redress complaints by shareholders and
investors.”); THE TATA POWER CO. LTD., REPORT ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 2015–2016,
https://www.tatapower.com/aboutus/corporate-governance.aspx [https://perma.cc/4L8T-F79T](“The
responsibilities of the SRC inter alia include: Review of statutory compliance relating to all security
holders; Resolving the grievances of all security holders of the Company; Overseeing and reviewing
of all matters related to the transfer of securities and movement in shareholding and ownership of the
Company.”).
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governing listed securities with the intent “to consolidate and streamline
the provisions of existing Listing Agreements, thereby ensuring better
enforceability.”117
In addition to shareholder rights, the SEBI Listing Regulations
recognize a role for stakeholders in corporate governance, stating that:
(i) The listed entity shall respect the rights of stakeholders that are
established by law or through mutual agreements.
(ii) Stakeholders shall have the opportunity to obtain effective redress
for violation of their rights.
(iii) Stakeholders shall have access to relevant, sufficient and reliable
information on a timely and regular basis to enable them to
participate in corporate governance process.
(iv) The listed entity shall devise an effective whistle blower
mechanism enabling stakeholders, including individual employees
and their representative bodies, to freely communicate their concerns
about illegal or unethical practices.118

The SEBI Listing Regulations also address stakeholder concerns by
detailing the accountability of the board of directors and the company’s
disclosure obligations. The regulations provide that
[t]he board of directors and senior management shall conduct
themselves so as to meet the expectations of operational transparency
to stakeholders while at the same time maintaining confidentiality of
information in order to foster a culture of good decision-making. . . .
[and,] [t]he board of directors shall maintain high ethical standards
and shall take into account the interests of stakeholders.119

The SEBI Listing Regulations also include significant additional reporting
obligations for large entities. The top 100 listed entities must file a
business responsibility report describing the initiatives taken by them from
an environmental, social, and governance perspective.120

117. Press Release, Securities and Exchange Board of India, SEBI Board Meeting (PR No.
130/2014) (Nov. 19, 2014), http://www.sebi.gov.in/sebiweb/home/detail/29593/yes/PR-SEBI-BoardMeeting [https://perma.cc/6Y9C-NMPG]; see also Press Release, Securities and Exchange Board of
India, SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015 (PR No. 226/2015)
(Sept. 3, 2015), http://www.sebi.gov.in/sebiweb/home/detail/31894/yes/PRSEBI-ListingObligationsand-Disclosure-Requirements-Regulations-2015-Listing-Regulations
[https://perma.cc/EW4LM745].
118. SEBI LISTING REGULATIONS, supra note 97, at Reg. 4.2(d).
119. Id. at Reg. 4.2(f).
120. Id. at Reg. 34.2.

488

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 40:465

5. Changes in Disclosure Policy and Practices
An important element of the Companies Act and the SEBI Listing
Regulations is the move toward significant additional disclosures to be
provided by the company and the board. Experts have stated that
“transparency with self-reporting and disclosure is the foundation of [the]
new Companies Act, 2013.”121 Section 134 of the Companies Act outlines
a long list of details that must be included in annual reports by the board
of directors.122 For example, Section 134(6)(o) requires that board reports
include “the details about the policy developed and implemented by the
company on corporate social responsibility initiatives taken during the
year.”123 With respect to CSR, the Companies Act requires that the board
of the company must, after taking into account the recommendations made
by the CSR committee, approve the CSR policy for the company, disclose
its contents in the board report, and publish the details on the company’s
official website.124 In addition, directors must issue a responsibility
statement with significant information on internal and financial controls,
including whether they “had devised proper systems to ensure compliance
with the provisions of all applicable laws and that such systems were
adequate and operating effectively.”125
Presently, it is not clear whether the extensive disclosure
requirements of the Act and the SEBI Listing Regulations will achieve
their stated goal. Per a 2016 study by Deloitte, many companies have
failed to include some of the disclosures required by the Act.126 It is also
still too soon to determine whether stakeholders will use the disclosures
given by companies to pressure for greater accountability in corporate
practices.
Nevertheless, disclosure can be a useful tool for non-government
organizations, employees, and other stakeholder groups, who hope to hold
the firm responsible to stakeholders beyond shareholders. Disclosure can
also be used by institutional players, such as proxy advisory firms, which

121. ERNST & YOUNG, INDIA INC. COMPANIES ACT, 2013 (Sept. 2, 2013),
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/India_Inc_Companies_Act_2013/$File/India_Inc_Com
panies_Act_2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/U275-VN4Z].
122. Companies Act, 2013, supra note 1, § 134(3).
123. Companies Act, 2013, supra note 1, § 134(3)(o).
124. Companies Act, 2013, supra note 1, § 135(5)(f).
125. Companies Act, 2013, supra note 1, § 134(5).
126. See DELOITTE, INSIGHTS INTO ANNUAL REPORTS FY2015 (March 2016),
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/in/Documents/risk/in-risk-insights-into-annualreports-noexp%20FY2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/6853-XMEA]; see also Indian Firms’ Disclosure in
Annual Reports Just a Tick in the Box: Deloitte, HINDU (May 24, 2016),
http://www.thehindu.com/news/cities/mumbai/business/indian-firms-disclosure-in-annual-reportsjust-a-tick-in-the-box-deloitte/article8639123.ece [https://perma.cc/XC3U-9ZLK].
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have recently gained some prominence in India.127 There are several very
active proxy advisory firms in India, which not only analyze corporate
proposals and provide voting recommendations but also focus on
corporate governance trends in general, including matters related to
CSR.128 Other analysts can also use the more robust disclosure regime to
ensure greater accountability for corporate boards.129 One potentially
useful institution that can be a powerful agent for furthering the legislative
moves in India would be an independent and unbiased third party entity,
such as B Lab, to create assessment and analytical tools to help boards
better assess their company’s impact on various stakeholders.130
III. EVALUATING INDIA’S NEW CORPORATE PURPOSE FRAMEWORK
While India has moved toward redefining corporate purpose with a
stakeholder approach, whether this move will be effectively implemented
is subject to many questions. This section addresses some of the questions
that arise with respect to India’s legislative reforms, including definitional
problems with the law itself, issues with potential enforcement, and
challenges related to the closed ownership structure of Indian firms.
Despite these challenges, there is hope that stakeholders can utilize the
tools offered by the new legislation to nudge Indian boards toward a
stakeholder approach.
A. Who are the Stakeholders and What Should Directors Do to Balance
the Interests of Various Stakeholders?
Several challenges with India’s new approach to corporate purpose
begin with the law itself. One of the concerns with the legislative changes
is that there remains much confusion in both the Companies Act and the
SEBI Listing Regulations with respect to the language and mandates
placed in legislation. A second concern with the legislation is a more
fundamental concern that a more diffuse duty as espoused in the Act may
make directors’ fiduciary duty of little value.

127. See Umakanth Varottil, The Advent of Shareholder Activism in India, 1 J. ON GOVERNANCE
582, 602–03 (2012).
128. See, e.g., CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: REVIEW, supra note 104.
129. Lijee Philip & Kausik Datta, Analysts Go Beyond Numbers to Take on Promoters: Will
Corporates Learn to Live with Criticism?, ECON. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2012, 6:00 AM),
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/company/corporate-trends/analysts-go-beyond-numbersto-take-on-promoters-will-corporates-learn-to-live-with-criticism/articleshow/15578933.cms
[https://perma.cc/2PKU-KZ43].
130. About B Lab, supra note 39; State by State Status of Legislation, supra note 39; Doug Bend
& Alex King, Why Consider a Benefit Corporation?, FORBES (May 30, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/theyec/2014/05/30/why-consider-a-benefitcorporation/#88b39b36ea31.
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The language of stakeholder duties in the Act and the SEBI Listing
Regulations fails to make clear the universe of potential stakeholders.
While Section 166 appears to indicate a broad universe of stakeholders,
one could read the provisions of the Code for Independent Directors as
envisioning a narrower group of stakeholders limited to employees and
minority shareholders.131 But, Section 166 envisions the community and
the environment as stakeholders, so are future generations affected by
corporate activity stakeholders?
There is also a significant lack of clarity and specific standards for
directors charged with balancing the conflicting “interests” of
stakeholders.132 Board members may rightly ask if “interests” are broader
than “rights” and if so, how does a board go about identifying “interests”
of stakeholders? Both the Act and the SEBI Listing Regulations are also
vague as to how directors should weigh the interests of varying groups of
stakeholders. In terms of “balancing” these competing interests, how does
a board develop a consistent method to measure and balance these
interests? In measuring stakeholder interests, how does a board measure
the value of other forms of life that are present in the environment and
affected by the activities of a firm? How does the board balance its
responsibilities when there are conflicts between the interests of different
stakeholders? The lack of guidance regarding how directors should go
about considering the interests of stakeholders is in contrast with the
clearer ESV approach in the U.K. where directors must “prioritize” the
interests of shareholders above other stakeholders.133
A more fundamental concern with the stakeholder-oriented model
espoused in the Act and SEBI Listing Regulations is the overly permissive
or deferential nature of this model. If the board is accountable to everyone,
could it then not be accountable to anyone? Scholars have raised the
concern that the broad wording of Section 166 of the Act provides
“directors with substantial (and somewhat untrammeled) discretion” that
would allow them “to foster their own self-interest, and leave them with
little accountability to anyone.”134
The criticisms about the universe of stakeholders and the lack of
guidance the law provides to directors in making corporate decisions or to
courts evaluating board actions mirrors criticisms levied against the
benefit corporation model in the U.S. Corporate law experts in the U.S.

131. Compare Companies Act, 2013, supra note 1, § 166, with Companies Act, 2013, supra
schs. IV, III(12).
132. My gratitude to Mr. Nawshir Mirza for thoughtful discussions regarding these points.
133. See BRUNER, supra note 32, at 34.
134. Naniwadekar & Varottil, supra note 12, at 19–20.
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have criticized various aspects of the benefit corporation form.135 Criticism
of the benefit corporation form includes concerns that “the ‘general public
benefit’ concept is too vague, provides insufficient guidance to directors
when they face zero-sum games, and should be supplemented to require
the prioritization of the interests, or at least the identification of the benefit
corporation’s primary interest.”136 Others have expressed concern that the
broad discretion afforded to directors by benefit corporation statutes may
allow directors to favor their own interests.137
Given the relative youth of the benefit corporation model and India’s
recent move toward a stakeholder-oriented purpose, debates about these
models and whether they will be successful will undoubtedly continue.
B. Enforcement Challenges
With respect to many legal reforms, particularly in the realm of
corporate law, India has faced significant problems with enforcement and
implementation. For example, in enforcing the vast corporate governance
reforms contemplated by Clause 49, SEBI fell short, and compliance
inadequacies were rampant, particularly for companies where the
government was the controlling shareholder.138 Further, courts in India
have not played a significant role in the enforcement of modern corporate
law.139 Remedies for shareholders, such as derivative actions, have not
played any real role in enforcing directors’ fiduciary duties.140 Moreover,
litigation in India is notoriously delayed; it takes a significant amount of
time, approximately fifteen years, for final resolution of a case.141
According to some reports at the end of 2013, more than 31 million cases
were pending in various courts, all the way up to the Supreme Court.142 By
some calculations, “[i]f the nation’s judges attacked their backlog

135. See generally Michael B. Dorff, Why Public Benefit Corporations? 42 DEL. J. CORP. L.
(forthcoming 2017) (chronicling the various critiques against the benefit corporation form).
136. Murray, The Social Enterprise Law Market, supra note 37, at 549.
137. See Dana Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations: A Sustainable Form of Organization?, 26
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 591, 598–600 (2011).
138. See Afsharipour, Corporate Governance Convergence, supra note 11, at 388–90.
139. See Varottil, Evolution of Corporate Law, supra note 11, at 318–19.
140. See Vikramaditya Khanna & Umakanth Varottil, The Rarity of Derivative Actions in India:
Reasons and Consequences, in THE DERIVATIVE ACTION IN ASIA: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL
APPROACH 380 (Dan W. Puchniak et al. eds., 2012) (finding that “over the last sixty years only about
ten derivative actions have reached the high courts or the Supreme Court. Of these, only three were
allowed to be pursued by shareholders, and others were dismissed on various grounds”).
141. See id.
142. See id. at 319.
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nonstop—with no breaks for eating or sleeping—and closed 100 cases
every hour, it would take more than 35 years to catch up.”143
In addition to weaknesses in regulatory and judicial enforcement, the
Companies Act as it stands provides little opportunity for nonshareholder
stakeholders to bring an enforcement action to protect their interests. For
example, there appears to be little opportunity for stakeholders to find a
remedy in the courts for director violations of the board’s duty to consider
the interests of stakeholders under Section 166 of the Companies Act.144
While the Companies Act contemplated the establishment of a National
Company Law Tribunal to address corporate law disputes, including a
newly introduced class action remedy, a close reading of the statute
suggests that “the class action remedy is unavailable to stakeholders in
ensuring the enforcement of directors’ duties of which they are the
ultimate beneficiaries.”145
The lack of enforcement remedies for stakeholders under the
Companies Act mirrors the lack of specific remedies for nonshareholders
in both the U.K. and the U.S. models. In the U.K., even under the ESV
model, directors’ duties are owed only to the company, and stakeholders
cannot seek remedies against directors.146 In the U.S. benefit corporation
form, only shareholders, and not the other stakeholders, may bring a
benefit enforcement proceeding.147
Other sections of the Companies Act relating to stakeholder interests,
such as the CSR provision, similarly suffer from enforcement weaknesses.
Under the law, the penalties for companies that fail to report and spend
adequately on CSR activities are rather minimal. For companies that fail
to spend 2% of their profits on CSR activities, Section 135 of the Act does
not contemplate any enforcement.148 There is potential enforcement of the
failure to adequately report on CSR activities under Section 134(8) of the
Act.149 However, the enforcement process is only in the early stages
because the CSR requirement only came into effect for financial year

143. Tom Lasseter, India’s Stagnant Courts Resist Reform, BLOOMBERG BUS.WEEK (Jan. 8,
2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-01-08/indias-courts-resist-reform-backlog-at314-million-cases [https://perma.cc/XQK9-BW9N].
144. See Naniwadekar & Varottil, supra note 12, at 15.
145. See id. at 16.
146. See id. at 15.
147. See Murray, The Social Enterprise Law Market, supra note 37, at 550.
148. See Afsharipour & Rana, supra note 3, at 226.
149. Companies Act, 2013, supra note 1, § 134(8), suggests that a company which neither invests
in CSR Activities nor provides the required disclosure will be subject to a fine of not less than Rs.
50,000 but which may extend to Rs. 25,00,000, and every officer of the company who is in default
may be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years or with fine which
may not be less than Rs. 50,000 but which may extend to Rs. 5,00,000 or with both.
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2014–2015.150 In addition, a 2015 report of a committee formed by the
MCA suggested that “leniency may be shown against the companies for
non-compliance in [the] initial two/three years to enable them to graduate
to a culture of compliance. This is being recommended because [the]
initial three years will be a period of learning for all the stakeholders.”151
Moreover, the MCA has publicly stated that “the main thrust and spirit of
the law is not to monitor but generate a conductive environment for
enabling the corporates to conduct themselves in a socially responsible
manner.”152
Whether the MCA’s vision for creating an atmosphere of greater
social responsibility will come to fruition will depend in part on the quality
of the CSR reporting done by companies. Proponents of the CSR
provisions of the Companies Act argue that this type of CSR disclosure
can “enable dissemination of information to society about the value
generated by the company’s activities and will facilitate monitoring.”153
With respect to benefit corporations in the U.S., proponents similarly
argue that the requirements of the benefit corporation form increase
transparency through the requirement of annual benefit reports.154
Moreover, some scholars have argued that annual benefit reporting serves
a potentially powerful function that would allow for boards and the entity
to reflect upon the purpose of the company and the decision-making
processes undertaken.155 With respect to CSR reporting by Indian firms, it
may be still too early to have a definitive view as to the value of these
reports, although a recent study has found that early reports do not provide
much specific information to stakeholders.156
Despite the lack of effective enforcement or legal remedies for
stakeholders, there is also a possibility that the amended duties and
150. See Rajat Arora & Deepshikha Sikarwar, 100 Companies Get Government Notice to CSR
Spend, ECON. TIMES (July 16, 2016, 3:41 AM), http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/company/
corporate-trends/100-companies-get-government-notice-on-csr-spend/articleshow/
53234608.cms [https://perma.cc/U32C-K6G9].
151. GOV’T OF INDIA, MINISTRY OF CORP. AFFAIRS, REPORT OF HIGH LEVEL COMMITTEE 28
(Sept. 2015), http://mca.gov.in/Ministry/pdf/HLC_report_05102015.pdf [https://perma.cc/UMR8MF27].
152. GOV’T OF INDIA, MINISTRY OF CORP. AFFAIRS, GENERAL CIRCULAR NO. 01/2016:
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS WITH REGARD TO CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY UNDER
SECTION 135 OF THE COMPANIES ACT, 2013 (2016), http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/pdf/
FAQ_CSR.pdf [https://perma.cc/FQ96-7XXL].
153. Gopalan & Kamalnath, supra note 10, at 103. Other authors have argued that the current
“statutory requirements involving benefit reports are extremely vague, susceptible to white- and greenwashing, and generally lack an express enforcement mechanism for punishing benefit corporations
that do not provide the reports.” Murray, The Social Enterprise Law Market, supra note 37, at 551.
154. See Murray, The Social Enterprise Law Market, supra note 37, at 550.
155. See Ball, supra note 48, at 966–67.
156. See Gopalan & Kamalnath, supra note 10, at 95.
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responsibilities espoused in the Companies Act will affect board function
and decision-making. Many boards consider reputational and relationship
issues significant even without the threat of a lawsuit. Formal judicial
enforcement is not the sole method that can be used by various
stakeholders. Around the world companies have developed deep
relationships with various stakeholders and have engaged significantly
with the interests of their stakeholders.157 It may be that the broadened
fiduciary duties of directors under the Companies Act may propel Indian
boards and stakeholders to approach each other in new and innovative
ways.
C. The Continuing Dominance of Promoters and Its Implications
for Corporate Purpose
An important question about the efficacy of India’s redefined
corporate purpose is whether a broad mandate to consider and balance the
interests of all stakeholders is possible in a system where firms are
primarily dominated by controlling shareholders of business families or
the state. Given the broadly worded provisions of the Act, which give
much discretion to the board, this concern is particularly acute because
even independent directors in India often view their position with an
allegiance to the controlling shareholder.158 Thus, directors could, within
their discretion, place a priority on the interests of promoters over other
shareholders or stakeholders.
Even if directors want to take into consideration the interests of
nonshareholders, the entire system of director nomination and election in
India is subject to the voting power of controlling shareholders. Under the
Act, as well as under the SEBI Listing Regulations, publicly listed
companies must have a nomination and remuneration committee (the
NRC), which is to consist of three or more non-executive directors out of
which not less than one half must be independent directors.159 The
chairperson of the company, whether an executive or non-executive
director, may be appointed as a member of the NRC but is not permitted

157. See GLOB. CORP. GOVERNANCE FORUM & INT’L FIN. CORP., STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT
THE
BOARD: INTEGRATING BEST GOVERNANCE PRACTICES 1–2
(2009),
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/pt/791711468330347261/pdf/629800WP0Stake00
Box0361496B0PUBLIC0.pdf [https://perma.cc/6LKL-PP8J].
158. See Vikramaditya Khanna & Shaun J. Mathew, The Role of Independent Directors in
Controlled Firms in India: Preliminary Interview Evidence, 22 NAT’L L. SCH. OF INDIA REV. 35,
37–38 (2010).
159. Companies Act, 2013, supra note 1, § 178; SEBI LISTING REGULATIONS, supra note 97, at
Reg. 19.
AND
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to chair the committee.160 While the NRC must be composed of a majority
independent directors, experts have argued that the committee might be
compelled to function in the shadow of an ultimate shareholder decision
(with controlling shareholder influence).161 The regulatory framework in
India does not prohibit controlling shareholders from being on the NRC.
While such shareholder presence on the NRC could potentially provide an
opportunity for controlling shareholders to ensure that the NRC adheres to
best practices, it may also mean that directors will feel an allegiance to the
controlling shareholder and may be reluctant to oppose any corporate
actions proposed by such shareholder. Moreover, controlling shareholders
may also deliberately work to pack the board with people whose skill sets
do not match the company requirements so that they are not able to
question the management in an effective manner.
Despite concerns with the controlling shareholder model, there are
arguments that a broader corporate purpose and controlling shareholder
dominance may not be at odds. Scholars have argued that companies with
controlling shareholders may be better at protecting the interests of
stakeholders as they are motivated by the long-term interests of the
company more so than widely held firms with short-term shareholders.162
Examples abound of very successful controlled firms with broad
stakeholder engagement; most famously, the Tata Group in India which is
world renowned for its commitment to the community and other
stakeholders.163 Further, some scholars have argued that it is possible that
the incentives of controlling shareholders are better tied with the interests
of the company.164
CONCLUSION
India has undertaken a vast experiment with corporate purpose, one
whose outcome is, at best, unclear. Overall, the reforms under the
160. Companies Act, 2013, supra note 1, § 178(1); SEBI LISTING REGULATIONS, supra note 97,
at Regs. 19(1), (2).
161. The Companies Act requires companies to have a nomination committee composed of a
majority of independent directors. Companies Act, 2013, supra note 1, § 178; see also Khanna &
Mathew, supra note 158, at 64 (stating that the effectiveness of nominating committees “received
mixed reactions” with some directors articulating the continuing influence of promoters in the
selection process).
162. See Albert H. Choi, Costs and Benefits of Concentrated Ownership and Control (Va. L. &
Econ. Research Paper No. 19, 2016); see also COLIN MAYER, FIRM COMMITMENT: WHY THE
CORPORATION IS FAILING US AND HOW TO RESTORE TRUST IN IT 208–12 (2013) (advocating for
greater shareholder voting rights for long-term shareholders). But see Jessie Fried, The Uneasy Case
for Favoring Long-Term Shareholders, 124 YALE L.J. 1554, 1560 (2015).
163. See MAYER, supra note 162, at 195–97.
164. See, e.g., Ronald Gilson and Alan Schwartz, Corporate Control and Credible Commitment,
43 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 119 (2015).
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Companies Act and the SEBI Listing Regulations suggest (although they
do not guarantee) that India intends to transform corporate purpose beyond
the ESV model adopted in the U.K. Moreover, unlike the U.S. move to
allow for benefit corporations, India’s transformation of corporate purpose
does not apply to a mere subset of entities, but instead contemplates an
overhaul of corporate vision in Indian firms. Nevertheless, there is reason
to doubt that the specific legal provisions provided by the Companies Act
and the SEBI Listing Regulations will in fact lead to substantive
“structural change” given the various forces and institutions that may stand
in the way of redefining the purpose of the Indian firm.165
There is much potential in India’s model toward redefining the
purpose of the corporation beyond shareholder wealth maximization.
India’s move toward a pluralistic model that recognizes stakeholder
interests is a powerful vision that has the potential to significantly
transform corporate and board practices in India and beyond. Whether this
transformation will take place depends on the will of the various
stakeholders involved, including boards, shareholders, employees, and
civil society organizations, as well as on institutional players such as proxy
advisory firms and independent and unbiased third parties that can help
facilitate and support the board in achieving the broader purpose
envisioned by India’s reforms.

165. See MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF
AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE 275 (1994) (stating that “[l]egal change alone might not lead to
structural change” in long-standing ownership and governance structures given economic, political,
and institutional forces that favor the status quo).

